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Abstract 
Based on panel data from the City of Davis, California, comprising more than 15,000 urban 
water consumption units and 81 billing periods over 13 years, this study investigates 
residential water demand and the effectiveness of three structural water conservation 
measures. The city switched from a uniform to an increasing block pricing scheme, 
introduced a second tariff block for single-family residential households, and changed the 
calculation logic for the household sewer rate. An instrumental fixed effects regression 
analysis results in a price elasticity of -0.19 for residential consumers. The data also suggests 
that all structural tariff adjustments were effective, even under consideration of the general 
economic situation. This is the first study which demonstrates the effectiveness of coupling 
the sewer rate with a proxy for indoor water consumption on a household level. 
Keywords:  residential water demand; water pricing; price elasticity; panel data 
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1 Introduction 
Driven by population and income growth, many communities have to cope with increasing 
urban water demand in the presence of ever scarcer resource availability. Adjusting the price 
of water is the most common approach to curtail urban water demand. Among other factors, 
the price elasticity of demand determines the effectiveness of tariff changes. The greater the 
responsiveness to price increases, the higher the anticipated reduction in demand. 
An effective policy lever is to adjust the tariff structure. Volumetric pricing bears greater 
water saving incentives than a flat tariff. In addition, implementing an increasing block 
pricing (IBP) scheme offers further incentives to avoid over-consumption, as households are 
stepwise charged an increasing price per liter according to the amount of consumption. In 
practice, it is rare to find structural changes to the water pricing scheme. Hence, most 
empirical studies only investigate the impact of price changes and socioeconomic 
characteristics such as income, age, or household composition on water demand. The study by 
Nataraj and Hanemann (2008) is an exception. It outlines the impact of introducing an 
additional block to an existing IBP system in Santa Cruz, California. 
This study utilizes a rich data set from the City of Davis, California comprising more than 
15,000 individual water consumption units and 81 billing periods. Between 1996 and 2009 
the city excessively raised water tariffs and conducted several structural water conservation 
efforts. Employing an in-depth micro-econometric approach yields rare insights including the 
price elasticity of residential consumers based on longitudinal data and the effectiveness of 
three policy changes. This is the first study which empirically tests, whether coupling the 
sewer rate with winter water consumption on a household level has an impact on water 
demand. 
The paper starts with a brief literature review highlighting the key economic and econometric 
aspects when dealing with demand estimation. Section 3 provides an overview of the data and 
structural water tariff changes, while section 4 explains the steps to specify the model for the 
given context. Section 5 presents the main results including a novel approach to employ 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes with policy implications, literature contributions, and 
a proposal for future research. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Economic considerations 
Water in its consumptive form is considered an economic good. Hence increases in price 
should yield reductions in consumption. Several studies suggest that consumers are rather 
price insensitive, as water has limited substitutes for many purposes and the water bill makes 
up only a small fraction of disposable household income (Cavanagh et al. 2002). Empirical 
evidence is shown by Espey et al. (1997) who find a price elasticity of -0.51 with only 10% 
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lying above 0 and below -0.75. Agthe and Billings (1980), Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989), 
Pint (1999), Martínez-Espiñeira (2003) find a value between -0.25 and -0.75. 
Several studies attempt to determine, whether consumers react to average or marginal prices. 
Applying the Taylor-Nordin difference variable Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) find that 
consumers react to marginal prices. However, the literature offers several other price 
specifications, yet none proofs to be superior in terms of capturing consumer sensitivity. 
Martínez-Espiñeira (2003) uses average marginal price, Gaudin (2006) average price, 
Chicoine et al. (1986) and Griffin and Chang (1990) the difference of both. 
2.2 Econometric considerations 
The most common water tariff structure is increasing block pricing (IBP). It is characterized 
by marginal prices, which increase stepwise with rising consumption. Since the consumer 
pays the volumetric rate for each respective block, consumption within a lower block comes 
at a discount. This particular feature of an IBP system can be treated as an implicit income 
subsidy. Nordin (1976) incorporates this concept into an econometric context by creating a 
difference variable (D) which captures the size of the effect. Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991) 
finds that in water demand estimation D has a similar size than income on a household level, 
yet appears opposite in sign. The Taylor-Nordin difference variable becomes meaningful in 
water demand estimation, when data on income is not available or unreliable. However, the 
literature shows great controversy about D, since the strong assumption that consumers are 
aware of their water tariff in detail and adjust consumption accordingly is oftentimes not 
fulfilled. Shin (1985) introduces a “price-perception variable” which is added to the general 
demand estimation equation to reveal, whether consumers react to average or marginal prices.  
The literature on water demand estimation exhibits a range of different estimation approaches. 
For cross-sectional and panel data, ordinary least squares (OLS), two and three-stage least 
squares (2SLS and 3SLS), logit and instrumental variables (IV) can be used (Worthington and 
Hoffman 2006). Maximum likelihood techniques such as discrete/continuous choice or 
regression discontinuity approaches require more detailed data. OLS estimation has been 
widely applied, especially in earlier studies (Agthe and Billings 1980, Chicoine et al. 1986, 
Thomas and Syme 1998, Nieswiadomy 1992, Dandy et al. 1997). However, the problem of 
simultaneous choice remains and thus leads to biased estimates unless accounted for. Pint 
(1999) uses a fixed-effects model, but also obtains an upward-sloping demand curve. 
In standard 2SLS estimation the observed marginal price is regressed on a set of explanatory 
variables and then uses the predicted price as regressor to explain demand for water. Even 
though this model yields unbiased results, it does not account for the characteristics of block 
pricing (Cavanagh et al. 2002). Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991) propose an approach in 
which observed water consumption is regressed on marginal prices at fixed consumption 
levels. Then marginal price is predicted by the actual rate schedule and the quantity predicted 
in the first stage. This approach is successfully applied by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) as 
well as Higgs and Worthington (2001). Cavanagh et al. (2002) applies a two-stage GLS 
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random-effects model with instrumental variables. In addition to treating block cut-offs by 
using marginal prices at certain consumption points, this approach accounts for potential 
correlation between observations across households. 
The discrete/continuous choice model was introduced by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) and 
further applied to water demand estimation by Rietveld et al. (1997), Corral et al. (1998), Pint 
(1999), and Olmstead et al. (2007). Nataraj and Hanemann (2008) develop a regression 
discontinuity model in order to test the responsiveness of consumers when faced with an 
additional block.  
The underlying theoretical assumption in water demand estimation is the utility maximizing 
consumer who either tries to maximize consumption for a given budget or minimize costs for 
an anticipated demand level (Espey et al. 1997). Hence, the functional form of a water 
demand model needs to be evaluated according to its degree of realistically depicting actual 
behavior. Yet this aspect receives little attention compared to other issues (Renzetti 1992). 
Applied specifications include linear, double-log (Cobb-Douglas), and semilogarithmic 
(Stone-Geary). 
Despite apparent estimation advantages the linear functional form implies that consumers 
react proportionally to price changes along the whole demand function. This behavioral 
pattern contradicts reality, as consumers tend to become rather price-insensitive for very low 
and high consumption levels, since urban tap water has no substitutes for many usages and 
there is a maximum water need. A widely applied specification is the double-log, or Cobb-
Douglas functional form (e.g. Foster and Beatie 1981, Hewitt and Hanemann 1995, Olmstead 
et al. 2007, Mansur and Olmstead 2012). However, its major drawback with respect to 
modeling human behavior is that it unrealistically assumes a constant elasticity regardless of 
the price level. The log-linear specification is the most realistic depiction of human behavior, 
as it allows for changes in the elasticity along the price curve. The log-linear form has been 
applied in recent studies which test the effects of different water conservation approaches 
(Gaudin 2006) or estimating the price impact on urban water demand (Arbues et al. 2004). 
Monteiro (2010) provides a thorough overview of the different functional forms and their 
implications on water demand estimation. Testing which type of rate structure suits best in 
achieving pricing for scarcity and budget balancing, Roseta-Palma and Monteiro (2008) 
conclude that linear and semilogarithmic specification justify IBP, whereas a Cobb-Douglas 
type would point towards a uniform volumetric rate structure. 
3 Data 
Facing increasing groundwater depletion, rising infrastructure costs, and insecure climate 
conditions, the City of Davis has implemented several demand-side measures to ensure 
sustainable water availability since 1998. This includes water tariff structure changes as well 
as adjustments to the price level for all customer groups. Structural adjustments started in July 
1998, when the city switched from a fixed tariff system based on lot size to a two-part tariff 
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schedule. Under the new system, the water bill consists of a base rate depending on meter size 
and a volumetric pricing element. Single-family residential customers (SFR) started with a 
single block, i.e. the same marginal price for all units of water used, whereas all other 
consumer groups faced a two-tier IBP scheme from the beginning. In 2002, the city 
introduced an IBP structure also for SFR households. In the beginning of 2008, the sewer rate 
was coupled to household water consumption, i.e. bimonthly fees for the upcoming year are 
calculated based on actual winter water consumption of the previous year for the respective 
household. Water managers attempted to correct for the inequality arising from average 
citywide sewer rates which allowed high-end consumers to free ride on low-consumption 
water users.  
Regarding changes in the price level, there have been three base rate adjustments (four for 
SFR) leading to an absolute increase of 192% between 1998 and 2009. During the same 
period, the consumption rate increased four times (five times for SFR) resulting in an absolute 
increase of 271% on average over all consumer groups (see Table 1). 
The data was collected between March and June 2010 and comes from three different sources. 
First, the City of Davis Public Works Department provided consumption data and background 
information on the citywide conservation programs. Second, the city’s Finance Department 
contributed information on historical water rates and rate structure changes. Since the data 
does not exist electronically, they granted access to their books. Third, climatic and economic 
variables are drawn from the websites of the Western Regional Climate Center1 and the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics2. 
The whole data set ranges from period 1996/4 (Jul/Aug 1996) until 2009/6 (Nov/Dec 2009) 
and counts 81 bimonthly billing and consumption periods. In total, there are 15,712 
households resulting in approximately 1.2 million individual observations. Even though small 
and large customers can be distinguished based on meter size, the focus of this study is on the 
four major user groups (see Table 2). The data comprises different variables which differ in 
terms of their purpose and nature. Table 3 provides an overview and descriptive statistics of 
all variables used in the estimation procedure.  
The explained variable is bimonthly water consumption which is measured on a household 
level and assumed to be derived. This means that water demand is driven directly by price 
variables as well as economic, environmental, and household factors. Average price (AP) is 
calculated as the total water bill divided by consumption. Marginal price (MP) is the highest 
marginal price paid by the consumer in a certain period. Whereas some households switch 
between tier 1 and tier 2, others stay within one block regardless of the season or other 
factors. The same applies to the Taylor-Nordin difference variable (D) which quantifies the 
actual size of the implicit income subsidy of the consumer. 
1  http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/cgi-bin/cliMONtpre.pl?ca2294 (June 9, 2010) 
2  http://www.bls.gov/lau/#tables (June 9, 2010) 
SiAg-Working Paper 18 (2014); HU Berlin 
                                                          
 Evidence for the effectiveness of progressive urban water demand management 5 
Following one of the most common choices for instrumental variables in water demand 
analysis, institutionally determined rates at certain quantities serve as exogenous variables to 
explain actual marginal price. The choice of instruments follows estimation approaches by 
Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989), Renwick and Green (2000), Reynaud et al. (2005), or Ruijs 
et al. (2008). However, annual inflation may be another useful instrument, since it is highly 
correlated with water rates, but is assumed to be uncorrelated with consumption. Here, 
marginal price and inflation show a correlation of 0.928, even though no causal relationship 
can be determined. 
4 Model specification 
Based on traditional water demand analysis (e.g. Chesnutt and McSpadden 1991, Lyman 
1992, Renwick and Green 2000, Olmstead et al. 2007) a standard two-error model is 
employed (see Equation 1). The usual income term is replaced by the Taylor-Nordin 
difference variable (D). 
Even though many studies employ a log-log specification and the advantage of directly 
deriving elasticity values are known to the author, the linear function form remains as a 
placeholder for the three possible versions at this point, i.e. linear (lin-lin), log-linear (log-lin), 
and double-log (log-log). Since there is no empirically proven advantage of any of these 
specifications and they differ regarding assumptions on the price elasticity over the price 
range (Monteiro 2010), all versions are estimated initially to determine the impact of 
functional form on the price coefficient. 
Equation 1: 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 +  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Besides a minimum of water consumption used for drinking and daily hygiene purposes, 
demand is derived. Thus, water demand per consumer i in period t (wit) can be treated as a 
function of the following variables. The price variable (priceit), which for now should stay a 
placeholder for either marginal or average price, and the Taylor-Nordin difference variable 
(Dit) have a direct and indirect monetary effect on the consumer’s choice. Despite the 
controversy about the interpretation and validity of the rate structure premium (D), the 
variable is included here to account for the gain in consumer surplus from consuming in the 
second block (Nordin 1976). Matrix Zt contains covariates which affect water use in the 
whole city in the same way and only vary over time such as precipitation and temperature. 
The conservation policy tools (Xit) are added as dummy variables and differ between user 
groups, hence the subscript i. The model comprises two error terms of which μ accounts for 
time-invariant heterogeneous unobservable household characteristics such as water use 
preferences, use of water efficient technology or physical absence of occupants. ε represents 
the standard residual for random unknown factors and measurement errors (Olmstead et al. 
2007). Both error terms are assumed to be independent and identically distributed with zero 
means and constant variances, i.e. μ ~ N(0, σ2μ), ε ~ N(0, σ2ε).  
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In response to the consumer’s simultaneous choice of consumption and price, an instrumental 
variables approach is applied. In addition to a widely used instrument, a valid alternative is 
tested as well. The standard instrumental variable used in the literature is a set of marginal 
prices for certain consumption levels enforced by water management authorities. They are 
considered exogenous, since they are established independent of current resource use and for 
a fixed period of time beyond the length of the current consumption period. Here, thresholds 
of 10, 25, 50, 200, and 400 CCF are found to be useful. 100 CCF was dropped as rates for all 
user groups are the same as for 200 CCF, hence creating perfect multicollinearity. As an 
alternative instrument, we present the annual inflation rate. Its strength comes from the fact 
that its determination is completely independent of household level water consumption. 
Estimating the goodness of the instruments yields satisfying results for both options. The p-
value for the group of conditional marginal prices and for inflation is both sufficiently small 
(see Table 4). These results show that inflation is a valid alternative, when there is doubt that 
water prices are set exogenously of consumption. In order to be consistent with previous 
research, conditional marginal prices are used as instruments for further estimations. 
Equation 2: 









ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜑𝜑 ln(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 ln (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
According to Espey et al. (1997) and Dalhuisen et al. (2003), consumers react either to 
marginal or average prices. Shin (1985) was the first to develop a method to test for the 
respective price variable by including a price perception variable (see Equation 2). The two 
extreme cases are k=0, i.e. the true indicator is marginal price, and k=1, the true indicator is 
average price. By integrating this concept into the regression equation (see Equation 3), 
testing the respective coefficients φ and φk yields evidence for the consumers’ actual 
perception. In order to extract knowledge about k, the two hypotheses in Equations 4 and 5 
are tested. Estimating both equations results in p-values of 0.07 and 0.00 respectively. Hence, 
Davis water consumers react to marginal and not average prices. This result is in line with 
Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991) who show that consumers under an increasing-block price 
system follow marginal prices. 
Equation 4: 
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Equation 5: 




Given the panel nature of the dataset, both a fixed- and random-effects model could be 
applied. Results for a Hausman test suggest that a fixed-effects model is appropriate (see 
Table 5). Equation 6 shows the final model applied for further analyses.  
Equation 6: 
ln(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝚤𝚤���) = 𝛼𝛼 ln(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝚤𝚤�����) + 𝛽𝛽(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐷𝐷𝚤𝚤� ) + (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑍)𝛾𝛾 + (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋𝚤𝚤� )𝛿𝛿 + (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 −  𝜇𝜇𝚤𝚤� )
+ (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝚤𝚤�) 
5 Estimation and results 
This chapter comprises estimation results for several models in order to shed light on the 
water consumption pattern of Davis inhabitants. The first part uses the base model to elucidate 
differences in the price coefficient deriving from different estimation techniques. The second 
part evaluates differences in the estimation results between functional forms of the regression 
model. The third part focuses on the effectiveness of the three structural water conservation 
measures including robustness checks, whether the previous results are not confounded by the 
general economic trends. 
5.1 Base model results for different estimation techniques 
The first set of estimations demonstrates the need for instrumentation resulting from the 
simultaneous choice of consumption and marginal price. As expected, results for the OLS and 
FE model show positive price coefficients, 0.02 and 0.74 respectively (see Table 6). This 
shows that consumers rather allocate their consumption level based on price differences 
between blocks than adjust consumption in response to overall tariff increases. Applying an 
instrumental variable approach within the fixed effects framework yields a price coefficient of 
-0.19. This value is statistically significant and confirms that consumers treat water as a 
normal good. Also coefficients for the two instruments used, the marginal prices at 
consumption levels of 10 CCF and 50 CCF, prove to be significant at the 99% confidence 
level. 
The overall R2 value for each model ranges between 0.19 for the FE and 0.27 for the OLS 
specification. These values seem appropriate for the full sample and base model calculations, 
even though they are relatively small compared to other literature results (e.g. Pint 1999, 
Renwick and Green 2000, Monteiro 2010). Despite the focus on within-household variation, 
it is likely that the relatively low R2 values result from disregarding changes of household 
factors over time such as income, number of residents, possession of water use appliances, or 
attitude towards water saving. As housing in Davis is dominated by students, the population 
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structure within single-family houses changes frequently. Hence, even consumption records 
over the whole time period might not necessarily represent the consumption pattern of the 
same tenants. 
All models have in common that coefficients for the covariates are all significant at the 99% 
confidence level and show the expected sign. The data confirms that consumers react 
negatively to greater rainfall and use more water, when temperatures rise. These results hold 
true albeit accounting for seasonal adjustments. A dummy variable for capturing the effect of 
the four summer months May-August was included and shows coefficients between 0.09 and 
0.14 depending on the model. 
5.2 Structural water conservation 
The following section deals with the three structural water policy measures introduced during 
the time span of this analysis, i.e. the introduction of volumetric pricing, the introduction of 
IBP for an existing two-part tariff system, and coupling of the sewage bill to a proxy for 
indoor water consumption. All programs enter the estimation equation as dichotomous 
variables with a value of “1”, when the program is effective, and “0” else. 
In addition to general water demand estimation, this paper offers unique findings on the 
success of structural water conservation efforts. Motivated by the claim that consumers in 
Davis respond more to the general economic situation than to specific water conservation 
measures, the three conservation measure variables IBP, tier, and sewer are tested with 
respect to their robustness against county level annual per capita income (incomepc) and 
unemployment rate (unemployment). These two variables serve as a proxy, since one can 
assume that households are better off, when per capita income increases and the 
unemployment rate decreases. If reductions in household water use may not only be attributed 
to price changes, rebate programs, or other intentional efforts, but are rather indirectly 
induced, water policies need to be seen from a different perspective. Results are summarized 
in Table 7. 
The first analysis focuses on the introduction of volumetric pricing with a uniform structure 
for single-family households in the second half of 1998. All other user groups are excluded, 
since they started with a two-tier block pricing structure from the beginning. The time period 
covered ranges from 4.1996 to 3.2002, as in 4.2002 a second block was introduced for SFR 
customers as well. These conditions reduce the sample to 443,262 observations and 13,822 
individual households. The overall R2 value is 0.27 for both models with a within-R2 value of 
0.46. The estimation of the model results in a statistically significant coefficient for IBP 
which takes a value of -0.11. Hence, the introduction of volumetric pricing was effective in 
reducing household water demand for single families. Coefficients for the covariates baserate, 
temperature, precipitation, and summer are statistically significant and show the expected 
signs. 
Adding per capita income and the countywide unemployment rate to the model does not 
change the results considerably. The coefficient for IBP remains statistically significant and 
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negative (-0.04). Hence, this robustness check demonstrates that the effect of the tariff 
structure change for single families holds true albeit external macroeconomic effects.  
The second analysis focuses on the introduction of a second block for single-family 
households. Between 4.1998 and 3.2002 the tariff structure for this user group used to be a 
combination of a fixed charge based on meter size and a volumetric rate for each cubic meter 
consumed. In 4.2002 the city introduced an IBP schedule with a threshold level of 36 CCF. 
The tariff structure change enters as a dichotomous variable (“tier”) showing a value of “0” 
for the time periods with one block and “1” after the introduction of IBP. Thus, the time 
period for this analysis ranges from 4.1998 to 6.2009 including 933,826 observations for 
14,648 individual households.  The overall R2 value is 0.73. Each of the models yields similar 
results for the usual regressors D, baserate, temperature, precipitation, and summer, which 
are statistically significant and show the expected sign. Estimation yields a statistically 
significant coefficient for tier with a value of -0.06. Hence, the policy change proves to be 
effective in reducing water consumption for SFR customers.  
However, families with a historic consumption level below the threshold are unlikely to adjust 
their water use. Their consumption pattern might not be affected by the introduction of the 
second block. Thus, the interaction term highcons_tier is introduced. It captures the effect of 
tier separately for high and low consuming households. Low is defined as a historic 
consumption level of less than one standard deviation below the mean (16.18 CCF) and high 
for bimonthly consumption greater than one standard deviation above the mean (55.76 CCF). 
The estimation yields a coefficient of -0.33 for highcons_tier. The policy change had the 
expected effect for the anticipated target group of high consuming households, yet the 
positive coefficient for tier suggests an ambiguous effect on low consuming families. 
The applied robustness checks yield similar results for all variables. The coefficient for the 
program variable remains negative for high consuming households (-0.32). In total, single 
family households respond effectively to the introduction of a second block independent of 
the overall economic situation.  
The variable for the third policy change represents the modification of the household sewer 
rate structure. As of 2008 households pay a sewage charge which depends on individual 
winter water consumption and, thus, reflecting consumers’ own contribution to the local 
sewage purification plant and infrastructure maintenance cost. This stands in contrast to the 
previous system, which was based on average citywide consumption.  The data includes all 
user groups, as the tariff modification was valid for the whole city resulting in 1.037.198 
observations. The estimation yields an overall R2 value of 0.31 and all variables turn out 
statistically significant and show the expected sign. As expected, the coefficient for the tariff 
structure change sewer has a value of -0.12. Hence, the data reveals that the change in the 
sewer rate structure effectively reduced household water consumption. 
Again, the robustness check involved an addition of data on county level per capita income 
and unemployment rate. Estimation results show a statistically significant negative 
consumption effect, yet the value is smaller than without the economic proxy variables  
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(-0.04). Nevertheless, households effectively adjusted water consumption in response to the 
tariff structure change despite marginal consideration of average income and unemployment 
levels in Yolo County. 
6 Conclusion 
This study employs a rich panel data set from the City of Davis, California covering 15,712 
households over 81 consumption periods between 1996 and 2009. In addition to sharp 
increases in the water rates, the city switched from a uniform to an increasing block pricing 
structure, introduced a second tariff block (IBP scheme) for single-family residential 
households, and changed the sewer rate structure in a way that the volumetric charge is based 
on past individual winter water consumption. Applying an instrumental variable fixed effects 
approach yields a price elasticity of -0.19 for single-family residential households. 
A policy analysis of the structural water conservation measures reveals that the adjustments 
prove to be effective in Davis. Single-family residential customers significantly reduced 
consumption, when moving from flat rate pricing to a two-part tariff with a uniform pricing 
element. Being faced with a second tier of an IBP scheme reduced water demand among this 
user group further. The adjustment of the sewer charge for the whole city also resulted in 
significant reductions in water consumption. Even though average consumption tends to 
decline in times of poorer overall economic conditions, water demand fluctuations due to 
these effects cannot be identified for consumers in Davis. 
The change of the sewage tariff system displays an innovative approach to provide incentives 
for yearlong and forward-looking water savings. It shows that the more accurate billing and 
the direct discretion over their sewer charge made consumers reduce their water demand. This 
finding is unique and of utmost importance for water managers who aim to employ an 
additional water conservation policy instrument beyond standard price increases, restrictions, 
or rebate programs. 
Despite water rate increases of about 271% between 1998 and 2009, the average water bill for 
Davis residents remained fairly constant. In the light of cost recovery for the utility provider, 
this indicates that there is sufficient room for further price increases in the future. The data 
suggests that the objectives of water conservation and sufficient revenue generation are likely 
to be achieved in Davis. Even if bound by revenue constraints for the utility provider, there is 
sufficient room to adjust the tariff structure towards more efficient pricing and increased 
equity. For instance, introducing a third block or raising the marginal price for the highest tier 
would lead to a more equitable scheme, in which the monetary burden on households would 
be more balanced and public utility revenues remain stable. As incomes are relatively high in 
comparison to the average water bill, high-consuming households could still afford extensive 
water consumption. 
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Adding to the rich body of water demand management literature, this study contributes in four 
ways to managing scarce water resources in the Southwest of the US. First, determining the 
price elasticity based on a longitudinal data set, which covers 14 years and more than 
80 billing periods, has never been done before and, thus, may provide credibility and 
reliability to other study results. The value of residential price elasticity (-0.18) lies within the 
range of findings from other studies (Espey et al. 1997, Dalhuisen et al. 2003). Estimating 
elasticities for each user group indicates that water consumers in this geographic area seem to 
be rather insensitive to price changes. Differences between user groups are marginal. 
Second, the only published study which addresses the introduction of an additional tier within 
an increasing block pricing scheme is Nataraj & Hanemann (2008). They use a regression 
discontinuity approach, whereas a fixed-effects approach is chosen here. However, both 
studies use a panel data set over a considerable number of years and find that adding another 
block yields a significant reduction in household water consumption for residential customers. 
Third, this is the first study known to the authors which tests the effect of a sewer rate 
structure change on household water consumption. Making the sewer rate dependent on 
winter water consumption provides water managers with an additional instrument to shape 
consumers’ water saving incentives. The present data suggests that this policy change 
significantly reduced household water demand. 
Forth, this study incorporates the unique analysis, whether observed changes in consumption 
are rather due to variation in the overall economic environment or conventional water demand 
factors (household characteristics, prices, conservation programs, or climate). Employing data 
for monthly per capita income and level of unemployment does not support this hypothesis. 
Drawn from the limitations of this study, future research should address the complexities of 
estimating urban water demand in a multidisciplinary fashion. Estimation results clearly 
indicate that households in the City of Davis effectively respond to monetary incentives in the 
form of tariff increases. However, as the rich literature on water economics suggests, water 
saving behavior is determined by a range of internal and external factors (Millock and Nauges 
2010, Grafton et al. 2011). As this data set lacks information on environmental attitude and 
beliefs, inferences on the degree of influence of those internal factors on the present 
estimation results cannot be drawn. In the quest for a more differentiated picture, accounting 
for the influence of psychological components may reflect differences in the degree of 
responsiveness to monetary incentives between households with high and low environmental 
attitudes and beliefs. Hence, the literature on water demand management will benefit greatly, 
if future studies take psychological components into account in addition to standard socio-
demographic characteristics, when estimating the effectiveness of water conservation 
programs. 
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Table 1:  Water pricing schedule for Davis, CA between 4.1998 and 6.2009 
 
Source: City of Davis Finance Department (2010) 
 
Table 2:  Water consumption per user group between 1996 and 2009 
 


















5/8'' or 3/4'' 01 5.66 6.22 6.22 8.40 10.00 10.10
1 - inch 02 7.70 8.83 8.83 11.80 14.10 14.10
1 1/2 - inch 03 12.78 15.31 15.31 20.30 24.30 24.30
2 - inch 04 18.89 23.11 23.11 30.50 36.50 36.50
3 - inch 06 35.21 43.94 43.94 57.80 69.10 69.10
4 - inch 07 53.54 67.34 67.34 88.40 105.70 105.70
6 - inch 08 104.46 132.32 132.32 173.60 207.60 207.60















Single-family residential SFR 0.49 0.63 0.77 1.09 1.30 1.48
0.49 0.68 0.86 1.41 1.69 1.87
Multi-family residential MFR 0.52 0.69 0.69 0.96 1.15 1.40
0.72 0.86 0.86 1.41 1.69 1.87
Small commercial/industrial COMM 0.58 0.72 0.72 0.99 1.26 1.39
0.72 0.86 0.86 1.41 1.69 1.87
Large commercial/industrial COMM 0.58 0.79 0.79 1.06 1.53 1.49
0.72 0.86 0.86 1.41 1.69 1.87
Irrigation IRR 0.63 0.77 0.77 1.28 1.30 1.39
0.72 0.86 0.86 1.41 1.69 1.87
The block thresholds changed in 4.2002: for SFR from 0 to 36 CCF, for MFR from 18 to 14 CCF, for small COMM from 111 
to 115 CCF, for large COMM from 589 to 619 CCF, IRR remains at 363 CCF
User house- Mean Std. Min Max
group holds (in CCF) Dev. (in CCF) (in CCF) (in tsd. CCF) in%
SFR 14,593 36.55 47.20 0 9,999 533 66
MFR 392 393.03 682.41 0 9,570 154 19
COMM 589 180.19 467.01 0 13,170 106 13
IRR 138 63.66 221.78 0 9,999 9 1
Total 15,712 55.51 182.47 ./. ./. 802 100
Total water demand p.a.
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Table 3:  Descriptive statistics 
 
Source: Own calculations 
  




consumption in CCF bimonthly household water consumption 55.52 182.48 0 13170
Price variables
MP in $ per CCF actual marginal price of water 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.87
AP in $ per CCF calculated average price of water 1.03 1.02 0.00 70.63
D in $ theoretical Taylor-Nordin difference variable 19.40 30.60 0.00 947.07
baserate in $  fixed bimonthly charge 7.87 5.81 5.00 329.80
Instrumental variables
MP10 in $ per CCF established marginal price at 10 CCF after 4.1998 0.70 0.39 0.00 1.87
MP25 in $ per CCF established marginal price at 25 CCF after 4.1998 0.71 0.39 0.00 1.87
MP50 in $ per CCF established marginal price at 50 CCF after 4.1998 0.82 0.52 0.00 1.87
MP200 in $ per CCF established marginal price at 200 CCF after 4.1998 0.82 0.52 0.00 1.87
MP400 in $ per CCF established marginal price at 400 CCF after 4.1998 0.83 0.52 0.00 1.87
inflation 1.00 = 4.1996 average bimonthly CPI in the US 1.19 0.12 1.00 1.40
Other variables
temperature in °F average bimonthly temperature 61.63 10.19 42.79 76.59
precipitation in inches average bimonthly precipitation 1.45 1.79 0.00 8.09
summer 0 / 1 summer periods: 1 if 3-4; 0 else 0.33 0.47 0 1
residential 0 / 1 customer group: 1 if residential; 0 else 0.93 0.25 0 1
incomepc in k$ average annual incomeper capita 29.94 4.20 23.32 37.13
unemploymentrate in % average annual unemployment rate 6.17 1.67 4.40 11.30
uniform 0 / 1 increasing block pricing: 1 after 4.1998; 0 else 0.88 0.33 0 1
tier 0 / 1 2nd tier for SFR: 1 after 4.2002; 0 else 0.58 0.49 0 1
sewer 0 / 1 new sewer rate system: 1 after 1.2008; 0 else 0.16 0.37 0 1
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Table 4:  Strength of selected instrumental variables for marginal price variable 
 
  
F test that all u_i=0:     F(15712, 1179832) =     6.30      Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .10393349   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .15985426
     sigma_u    .05444172
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.364952   .0015163 -2219.15   0.000    -3.367924    -3.36198
   inflation     3.456325   .0012683  2725.26   0.000     3.453839    3.458811
                                                                              
          MP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0362                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(1,1179832)       =  7.43e+06
       overall = 0.8604                                        max =     15937
       between = 0.9114                                        avg =      76.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.8629                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: locationid                      Number of groups   =     15713
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =   1195546
. xtreg MP inflation, i (locationid) fe
. 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  9,1179824) = 3.7e+06
       Constraint 4 dropped
 (10)  summer = 0
 ( 9)  temperature = 0
 ( 8)  precipitation = 0
 ( 7)  baserate = 0
 ( 6)  MP400 = 0
 ( 5)  MP200 = 0
 ( 4)  MP100 = 0
 ( 3)  MP50 = 0
 ( 2)  MP25 = 0
 ( 1)  MP10 = 0
. test MP10 MP25 MP50 MP100 MP200 MP400 baserate precipitation temperature summer
. 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(15712, 1179824) =    13.49      Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .21148941   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07952317
     sigma_u    .04118454
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1599216   .0008849  -180.73   0.000    -.1616559   -.1581873
      summer     .0056572   .0002359    23.98   0.000     .0051949    .0061196
 temperature      .002573   .0000136   189.82   0.000     .0025464    .0025995
precipitat~n     .0021174   .0000598    35.38   0.000     .0020001    .0022347
    baserate    -.0001388   .0000244    -5.70   0.000    -.0001865    -.000091
       MP400     .0292555   .0037082     7.89   0.000     .0219875    .0365235
       MP200     .2435766   .0044353    54.92   0.000     .2348835    .2522697
       MP100    (dropped)
        MP50     .0641735   .0026414    24.30   0.000     .0589964    .0693506
        MP25     .5669512   .0025627   221.23   0.000     .5619284     .571974
        MP10     .0944141   .0027633    34.17   0.000     .0889982      .09983
                                                                              
          MP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0355                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(9,1179824)       =  3.73e+06
       overall = 0.9623                                        max =     15937
       between = 0.9486                                        avg =      76.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.9661                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: locationid                      Number of groups   =     15713
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =   1195546
. xtreg MP MP10 MP25 MP50 MP100 MP200 MP400 baserate precipitation temperature summer, i (locationid) fe
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. estimates store b_re
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .47067952   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    111.89183
     sigma_u    105.51195
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.401193   1.499802    -0.93   0.350    -4.340751    1.538365
      summer     10.27224   .3330998    30.84   0.000     9.619378    10.92511
 temperature      .892898   .0192574    46.37   0.000     .8551542    .9306418
precipitat~n    -.9430398   .0843911   -11.17   0.000    -1.108443   -.7776362
    baserate    -.7974256   .0328905   -24.24   0.000    -.8618897   -.7329615
           D     1.444471   .0054995   262.65   0.000     1.433692     1.45525
          MP    -32.84739   .3072364  -106.91   0.000    -33.44956   -32.24521
                                                                              
 consumption        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       = 107847.28
       overall = 0.0777                                        max =     15937
       between = 0.0556                                        avg =      76.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.0833                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: locationid                      Number of groups   =     15713
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =   1195546
. xtreg consumption MP D baserate precipitation temperature summer, i (locationid) re
. estimates store b_fe
. 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(15712, 1179827) =    76.03      Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .61956445   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    111.89183
     sigma_u    142.79107
                                                                              
       _cons     4.163722   1.232842     3.38   0.001     1.747393    6.580051
      summer     10.21537   .3318051    30.79   0.000     9.565042     10.8657
 temperature     .8885115   .0191845    46.31   0.000     .8509105    .9261125
precipitat~n    -.9638202   .0840655   -11.47   0.000    -1.128586   -.7990548
    baserate    -1.312229   .0331106   -39.63   0.000    -1.377125   -1.247334
           D     1.438298   .0055191   260.60   0.000     1.427481    1.449116
          MP    -30.71617   .3074406   -99.91   0.000    -31.31875    -30.1136
                                                                              
 consumption        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0132                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,1179827)       =  17905.18
       overall = 0.0633                                        max =     15937
       between = 0.0361                                        avg =      76.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.0835                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: locationid                      Number of groups   =     15713
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =   1195546
. xtreg consumption MP D baserate precipitation temperature summer, i (locationid) fe
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =    22216.70
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      summer      10.21537     10.27224       -.0568732               .
 temperature      .8885115      .892898       -.0043865               .
precipitat~n     -.9638202    -.9430398       -.0207805               .
    baserate     -1.312229    -.7974256       -.5148038        .0038117
           D      1.438298     1.444471        -.006173        .0004645
          MP     -30.71617    -32.84739        2.131211        .0112042
                                                                              
                    b_fe         b_re        Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman b_fe b_re
. 
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Table 6:  Base model results for different estimation techniques 
 
  
Log-lin functional form OLS FE FE -
First stage
IV-FE






baserate 0.03*** -0.17*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
temperature 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
precipitation -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
summer 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
constant 0.84*** 1.95*** 0.00*** 1.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
R2 overall 0.27 0.19 0.93 0.26
# of observations 933,826             933,826             941,832             933,826             
# of groups n.a. 14,648               14,660               14,648               
Consumption period 4.98-6.09 4.98-6.09 4.98-6.09 4.98-6.09
* Significance at the 90% percentile
** Significance at the 95% percentile
*** Significance at the 99% percentile
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Table 7:  Estimation results for structural water conservation measures 
 
IV-FE estimation
ln (MP) -1.26*** -1.27*** -1.31*** -0.17*** 0.48***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
D 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
baserate  0.01**  0.01** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
temperature  0.03***  0.03*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
precipitation -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.03*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
summer  0.21***  0.22*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.14***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IBP -0.11*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.00)






incomepc -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
unemployment 1.65*** 0.00 -0.02***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
constant 1.65*** 2.11*** 2.61*** 2.64*** 2.95*** 1.55*** 3.11***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 overall 0.27 0.27 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.31 0.36
# of observations 443,262      443,262      933,826      933,826      849,201      1,037,198    942,442      
# of groups 13,822        13,822        14,648        14,648        14,633        15,698         15,679        
Sample SFR SFR SFR SFR SFR all all
Cons. period 4.96-3.02 4.96-3.02 4.98-6.09 4.98-6.09 4.98-6.09 4.98-6.09 4.98-6.09
* Significance at the 90% percentile
** Significance at the 95% percentile
*** Significance at the 99% percentile
Introduction of IBP
Change of sewer rate 
structureIntroduction of a second block
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